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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
By John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green 
Abstract 
This Article documents some of the sharp new conflicts over religion that have 
broken out in various countries of the world.  Apostasy, Blasphemy, Conversion, 
Defamation, and Evangelization—these are the new alphabet of religious rights violation 
in a number of regions around the world. Occurring at the intersection of religion and 
international human rights, they are also challenges to the universality of human rights 
and the democratic institutions that generate and affirm them.  And they stand in open 
violation of major international, regional, and domestic instruments designed to protect 
liberty of conscience, freedom of exercise for individuals and groups, religious equality 
and non-discrimination, among other norms.   
Keywords:  Religious freedom; Religious Liberty, Human Rights; Religion; 
Apostasy; Blasphemy; Conversion; Defamation; Evangelization; Ius Gentium; Law of 




 In January 2008, news headlines and human rights websites around the world 
broadcast the story of a death sentence handed down by a local Afghan court to a 23-
year-old journalism student, Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh, for committing the crime of 
blasphemy.1  The student had downloaded and distributed an article from the Internet 
after annotating it with words deemed to be an insult to the Prophet Mohammed. The 
article in question was critical of certain Islamic beliefs and practices that were seen as 
oppressive to women. Kambakhsh had allegedly added to the text some of his own 
criticisms of Mohammed’s teachings on women's rights.  The death sentence drew 
criticism from journalists, human rights activists, and political leaders around the world, 
inspiring European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering to protest to Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai: "The alleged 'crime' of this person would appear to be that he 
has distributed publications aimed at improving the situation of Afghan women."2  
 At the appeal court, Judge Abdul Salam Qazizada, a holdover from the Taliban 
era, was reportedly antagonistic toward Kambakhsh.3 In support of the blasphemy 
charge against Kambakhsh, the court considered as evidence anecdotal reports that 
that the young man was a socialist, was impolite, asked too many questions in class, 
and swapped off-color jokes and messages with friends. In October 2008, an Afghan 
appeals court overturned Kambakhsh's death sentence and sentenced him instead to 
twenty years in prison, presumably due to the considerable international attention to his 
case and international pressure on the Afghan government.4  Kambakhsh began his 
prison term in March 2009, the same month in which Afghan President Hamid Karzai 
signed a law specifying circumstances in which Afghan women of the Shia Muslim 
tradition must have sex with their husbands under Muslim family law.5  Interpretations of 
Islamic law as sanctioning marital rape may well have among the kinds of abuse of 
women’s rights that the young journalist Kambakhsh was seeking to address in his 
writing. 
 Such has been the state of religious liberty and human rights in an Afghanistan 
newly democratic and purportedly liberated from Muslim extremists.  This kind of story 
recurs in endless variations in the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and various former 
Soviet nations and provinces in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Clearly, religion and 
freedom do not yet coincide in many countries, however rosy their new constitutional 
 
1 "Afghanistan: Journalist Given Death Sentence for 'Blasphemy,'" Radio Free Europe, 23 January 2008; 
Abdul Waheed Wafa and Carlotta Gall, "Death Sentence for Afghan Student," The New York Times, 24 
January 2008; Nora Boustany, "Afghan Reporter's Death Sentence Draws Wide Condemnation," The 
Washington Post, 25 January 2008; "Afghan Senate Backs Death Penalty," BBC News, 30 January 2008. 
2 "EU Parliament President Calls for Life of Afghan Student to be Spared," theparliament.com, 21 January 
2008.  Accessible at:  http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200801/def9afd4-1ad8-4763-acd4-
75b5b316c6e4.htm (last accessed 4 February 2008). 
3 Jean MacKenzie, "Saving Parwez Kambakhsh," RAWA News, 16 June 2008. Accessed at: 
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/06/16/saving-parwez-kambakhsh.html, last accessed 23 
September 2008. 
4 "No Death Sentence for Afghan Journalist," The New York Times, October 21, 2008. 
5 Carlotta Gall and Sangar Rahimi, “Karzai Vows to Review Family Law,” The New York Times, April 4, 
2009. 
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claims to religious rights and freedoms for all. Apostasy, Blasphemy, Conversion, 
Defamation, and Evangelization—these are the new alphabet of religious rights violation 
in a number of regions around the world. Occurring at the the intersection of religion and 
international human rights, they are also challenges to the universality of human rights 
and the democratic institutions that generate and affirm them. 
 
The Human Rights Revolution and Global Awakening of Religion 
 The new concerns about religious rights and religious offenses come at a time in 
which religion has been a key beneficiary of a human rights revolution often viewed as 
universal, global, and democratic in normative aspiration, if not always in practical 
effect. Cresting in the last third of the twentieth century, the modern human rights 
revolution has helped to catalyze a great awakening of religion around the globe. One 
cause and consequence of this religious resurgence is that the ambit of human rights 
protections for and by religions has been substantially expanded. In part because of the 
global "third wave" of democratization, more than 200 major new statutes and 
constitutional provisions on religious rights have been promulgated since 1975--many 
replete with generous protections for liberty of conscience and freedom of religious 
exercise, guarantees of religious pluralism, equality, and nondiscrimination, and several 
other special protections and entitlements for religious individuals and religious groups.6  
These national guarantees have been matched with a growing body of regional and 
international norms building upon foundational guarantees contained in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights7 and successor instruments on religious 
freedom. With their legal and political status thus guaranteed, religious groups have 
enjoyed greater capacity to ease the plights and expand the rights of women, children, 
and refugees in many parts of the globe, and have been particularly effective in 
addressing matters related to what are increasingly referred to as the “third generation” 
of human rights, having to do with health (particularly HIV/AIDS), the environment, 
disaster relief, globalization, peace-making, and conflict transformation. 
 At the same time, however, this very same world human rights revolution has 
coincided with intensifying religious and ethnic conflict, oppression, and belligerence. In 
Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ethnic 
nationalism and religious extremism have conspired to bring violent dislocation or death 
to hundreds of rival religious believers each year, and persecution, false imprisonment, 
forced starvation, and savage abuses to untold thousands of others.  In France, 
Belgium, Germany, and Austria, political secularism, laicization, and nationalism have 
 
6 See analysis in Natan Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights: 25 Years After the 
Declaration (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), with sample documents collected in Ian Brownlie and 
Guy Goodwin-Gill, eds., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006);Tad Stahnke and J. Paul Martin, eds., Religion and Human Rights: Basic Documents (New York: 
Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, 1998) and Tore Lindholm et al., Facilitating 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). 
7 G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) 
[hereinafter "1948 Universal Declaration"]  
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combined to threaten civil denial and deprivation to a number of believers, particularly 
"sects" and "cults" of high religious temperature or of low cultural conformity. And in 
many parts of the world today, barbaric Islamicist terrorists have waged a destructive 
jihad against all manner of religious, cultural, and ethnic enemies, real and imagined. 
Other European nations, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, have also 
seen increased tensions concerning their rapidly growing Muslim minorities.  In 
communities across Asia, and into the Middle East and North Africa, Christians, Jews, 
and Muslims have faced sharply increased restrictions, repression, and more than 
occasional martyrdom.   
 Indeed, in many areas of the world, a new “war for souls” has broken out--a 
battle to reclaim the traditional cultural and moral fabric of these new societies, and a 
struggle to retain adherence and adherents to indigenous faiths.  In part, this is a 
theological war, as rival communities have often cast each other in religious terms. The 
ecumenical spirit of previous decades--characterized by the participation of the world’s 
nations and religious groups in the creation of the United Nations and the near 
unanimous approval of the 1948 Universal Declaration8 -- is giving way to sharp new 
forms of religious balkanization. In part, this is a legal war, as local religious groups 
conspire with political leaders to adopt statutes and regulations restricting the 
constitutional rights of their foreign religious rivals. Several countries of late have 
passed firm new anti-proselytism laws, imposed cult registration requirements, 
tightened visa controls, and instituted various other discriminatory restrictions on new or 
newly arrived religions. Several parts of the non-Western world seem to be on a new 
dawn of fundamentalist Islamic and Christian religious establishments.  These tensions 
exist under the surface of shiny constitutional veneers of international human rights 
instruments and despite the overall success of the human rights revolution.9 
 
“On Condition No One Asks Us Why”:  Human Rights as Universal Ius Gentium 
and Lingua Franca 
 Questions concerning religious freedom, democracy, and human rights are not 
new in international law. They confronted the drafters of the "international bill of rights" 
from the very beginning.  Some Muslim nations, particularly Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia, objected to provisions of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
dealing with marriage and family and guaranteeing the right to change one’s religion.10 
In the end, however, Saudi Arabia was the lone dissenter on the religious freedom 
provision and the only Muslim nation to withhold its full support through abstaining from 
 
8 See esp. the account of this ecumenism contained in John Nurser, For All Peoples and All Nations:  
Christian Churches and Human Rights (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005). 
9 Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
10 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New (New York: Random House, 2001), 154, 168, 222. 
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the final vote.11  The declaration was adopted with forty-eight votes in favor, eight 
abstentions, and no nations opposed.  
 In the sixty years since the Universal Declaration, human rights, including 
religious rights, have emerged as part of the common law, the ius gentium, of an 
emerging world culture. Historically, the ius gentium was the set of principles and 
customs that were common to several political communities and often the basis for 
treaties and other diplomatic conventions.  The ius gentium was not static, but changed 
over time and across cultures--as new interpretations of law were offered and became 
increasingly conventional.  Thus, the ius gentium provided a transtemporal, 
transcultural, and more or less universal set of norms and a consistent body of 
principles by which a person and a people could govern themselves.   
What gave the ius gentium enduring authority in the history of the West was that 
it drew heavily from all manner of legal and cultural traditions.  The ius gentium provided 
the foundation on which the international human rights apparatus emerged--haltingly in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and more fully in the twentieth, in the aftermath 
of two devastating world wars.  Universal and global inquiries into common laws and 
common principles of right living, in fact, predate the current calls for cosmopolitanism 
and globalization by many centuries. 
 In recent years, discussions of “Asian values” and Islamic human rights have 
revived earlier questions about the universality of human rights, particularly human 
rights grounded in or having to do with religion.  The charge has been that human rights 
are the hegemonic creatures of Western Christianity, or Enlightenment liberalism, or 
some admixture of the two. For some, these debates have raised questions about the 
foundations, even the existence, of human rights per se, whether or not the rights in 
question pertain or involve religion.  To the extent that these debates have prompted 
religious traditions to reconsider and retrieve their own traditions of and commitment to 
human rights, they are worthwhile conversations to have.  But inquiries into the 
relationship between religion and human rights need not be so foundationalist in their 
character and consequence.   
 Philosopher Jacques Maritain, one of a group of philosophers summoned by 
UNESCO to consult on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when asked how 
proponents over different ideologies could agree to a list of fundamental rights, replied 
“Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why.”12  The goal, he 
elaborated, was to agree “not on the basis of common speculative idea, but on common 
practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of 
man, and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance 
in action.”13 Philosophers and jurists since have also found value in nonfoundational, 
 
11 Ibid, 168. 
12 Glendon, A World Made New, 77 (emphasis added). 
13 Ibid., 77-78. 
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practical, anthropological, hermeneutical, and discursive approaches to human rights.14 
Whatever their foundation, religious or otherwise, it is increasingly the case that “human 
rights are accepted as a transcultural language”15 and that “the language of human 
rights has become a moral lingua franca.”16  
 The human rights norms that underlie much of the emerging international 
common law are not a static belief system born of Western Christendom and 
Enlightenment liberalism.  They are fluid, elastic, and open to challenge and change. 
The human rights regime is not a fundamental belief system. It is a relative system of 
ideas and ideals that presupposes the existence of fundamental beliefs and values that 
will constantly shape and reshape it. Human rights norms have grown in international 
law out of longstanding religious and cultural traditions. They have traditionally provided 
a forum and a focus for subtle and sophisticated philosophical, theological, and political 
reflections on the common good and our lives. They are derived from and dependent 
upon the transcendent principles that religious traditions, more than any other groups, 
continue to cultivate. But they are aimed universally at the common good of all peoples. 
The human rights regime is neither the child of Christianity and the Enlightenment, nor a 
ward under exclusive guardianship of either. 
 Human rights norms are the lingua franca and the ius gentium of our times, the 
common law of nations, the "middle axioms" in our moral and political discourse 
between the traditions and practices of the past and our aspirations and goals for the 
future.  Human rights have emerged today as one of the richest products of the 
interaction or religion and international law--the common law and common power of the 
emerging cosmopolitan world order. But the progress has not always been smooth, and 
there have been many obstacles and detours along the way. 
The International Law Framework of Religion and Human Rights 
 If the 1948 Universal Declaration provided the foundation for religious freedom as 
a human right, subsequent documents provided the framework.  Four international 
instruments contain the most critical protections of religious rights and liberties: (1) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the ICCPR"),17 (2) the United 
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief ("the 1981 Declaration on Religion and Belief"),18 (3) the 
 
14 See Abdullahi A. An-Naim, “Toward an Islamic Hermeneutic of Human Rights,” in Human Rights and 
Religious Values: An Uneasy Relationship? Abdullahi A. An-Naim et al., eds. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1995); Robert A. Schapiro, “The Consequences of Human Rights Fundamentalism,” 54 Emory 
Law Journal (2005): 171-85; John Kelsay and Sumner B. Twiss, “Universality vs. Relativism in Human 
Rights,” in Religion and Human Rights, John Kelsay and Sumner B. Twiss, eds. (New York: The Project 
on Religion and Human Rights, 1994). 
15 Jurgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 153. 
16 Michael J. Perry, Toward a Theory of Human Rights, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4. 
17 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. (Dec. 16, 
1966) [hereinafter "ICCPR"] 
18 G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 151), U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter 
"1981 Declaration on Religion and Belief"] 
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Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of the 
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the 
"1989 Vienna Concluding Document"),19 and (4) the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities ("the 1992 
Minorities Declaration").20   
 The ICCPR largely repeats the capacious guarantee of religious rights and 
liberties first announced in the 1948 Universal Declaration.  Article 18, the key religion 
provision, protects the "right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion," defined to 
include "freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of [one's] choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public and private, to manifest 
[one's] religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."  Permissible 
restraints on religious freedom are limited to instances that pose a risk to the "public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." 
Additional provisions of the ICCPR provide call upon state parties to prohibit "any 
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility, or violence," requiring equal treatment of all persons before the 
law and prohibit discrimination based on religion, and guaranteeing religious minorities 
"the rights to enjoy their own culture" and "to profess and practise their own religion."21  
 The 1981 Declaration on Religion and Belief elaborates the religious liberty 
provisions that the ICCPR adumbrated.  It sets forth a lengthy, illustrative catalogue of 
freedoms that illustrates more concretely the ICCPR's guarantees.22  Specifically 
enumerated rights include the rights to worship and assemble, to maintain charitable 
and humanitarian institutions, to acquire and use ritual objects and materials, to produce 
and disseminate publications, to teach religion, to solicit and receive financial and other 
charitable contributions, to designate religious leaders, to celebrate holy days and days 
of rest, and to communicate to those within and without the faith both nationally and 
internationally. It also includes more elaborate prohibitions than the ICCPR on religious 
discrimination and intolerance, barring religious "discrimination by any State, institution, 
group of persons, or person" and defining discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on religion or belief, and having as its purpose or as its 
effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise of human 
rights or fundamental freedoms on an equal basis." 
 The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document extends the religious liberty norms of the 
1981 Declaration, particularly for religious groups.  It prohibits religious discrimination 
against both "individuals and communities . . . in all fields of civil, political, economic, 
 
19 28 I.L.M. 527 [hereinafter "1989 Vienna Concluding Document"] 
20 G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/135/Annex, 18 December 1992 [hereinafter "1992 
Minorities Declaration"]  
21ICCPR provisions cited in this paragraph include Arts. 18, 20.2,  21, 26, and 27. It should be noted that 
the ICCPR has been ratified by 162 of the 192 countries that are members of the United Nations, 
including almost all of the Muslim states who are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). 
22 1981 Declaration on Religion and Belief, Arts. 1 and 6 
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social and cultural life." 23  It recommends "norms of mutual tolerance and respect 
between believers of different communities as well as between believers and non-
believers” and includes a number of specific free exercise grants that recognize and 
balance throughout the rights of "individual believers and communities of believers." A 
number of its religious group rights provisions reflect the international right to self-
determination of peoples, long recognized as a basic norm of international law.   
 The 1992 Minorities Declaration recognizes the right to self-determination of 
groups within pluralistic societies even more fully. It guarantees a religious community 
the right to practice its religion, an ethnic community the right to promote its culture, and 
a linguistic community the right to speak its language without undue state interference 
or unnecessary legal restrictions. The Declaration recognizes "the promotion and 
protection of the rights" of religious, cultural, and linguistic minorities as "an integral part 
of the development of a society as a whole and within a democratic framework based 
on the rule of law."24 So conceived, the right to religious self-determination provides 
religious groups some of the same strong protections afforded to religious individuals 
under the freedom of conscience guarantee.  It also expands group rights beyond the 
usual parameters of language, ethnicity, and geography, to include groups based on 
religious affiliation. 
 In recent years, two Islamic declarations on human rights have drawn attention 
for their distinctive views of religious freedom.  The 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration 
of Human Rights, as its title suggests, is framed in highly universal terms.  Its foreword 
proclaims it to be a "declaration for mankind," invoking a classic Qur'anic passage 
describing the creation of humanity "into nations and tribes, so that you might come to 
know one another."25   It guarantees "freedom of belief, thought, and speech" and, more 
specifically, a person's "right to freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with 
his religious beliefs." It condemns actions that "hold in contempt or ridicule the religious 
beliefs of others or incite public hostility against them," and declares that "respect for the 
religious feelings of others is obligatory on all Muslims."  Above all, it declares, that the 
“Qur'anic principle 'There is no compulsion in religion' shall govern the religious rights of 
non-Muslim minorities" and "[i]n a Muslim country religious minorities shall have the 
choice to be governed in respect of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law, or 
by their own laws."26  The Universal Islamic Declaration would appear to be a clear 
indication that notions of universal human rights do exist in Islam, including the right to 
religious freedom.  
 The more recent 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights, by contrast, contains 
no articles specifically devoted to religious freedom, but it does cite "race, color, 
language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, [and] social status” as impermissible 
 
23 All references in this paragraph are to 1989 Vienna Concluding Document, Principle 16. 
24 1992 Minorities Declaration, Preamble. 
25 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (London: Islamic Council, 1981), foreword (quoting 
Qur'an, Sura 49:13). Accessible at:  http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html, last accessed  May 3, 
2009. 
26 Ibid.., Arts. 13, 12, 14, 10 
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bases of discrimination.27  Religious rights are mentioned in a provision on educational 
rights, as well as in the context of the believer’s right "to live in security for himself, his 
religion, his dependents, his honor, and his property."28  At the same time, a provision 
on free speech limits the applicability of free speech guarantees in cases where such 
speech would "arouse nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or do anything that may be an 
incitement to any form of racial discrimination."29 In its linkage of religion to race and 
other categories of identity, the Cairo Declaration, is a precursor to the more recent 
connections made between religion, race, and ethnicity in the “combating defamation of 
religions” resolutions that have been introduced by the Muslim member states of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) at the United Nations in recent years.  As 
we shall see, the conflation of religion, race, and ethnicity in those resolutions suggests 
a potentially narrower ambit of religious freedom than the earlier Universal Islamic 
Declaration. But it is equally important to recognize that the Cairo Declaration does 
affirm the fundamental nature of religious rights, even as it hints at the grounds for their 
restriction. 
The New Alphabet of Religious Freedom:  Points of Tension and a Challenge for 
Universality 
 The various international human rights instruments set forth in the previous 
section highlight and address a number of the hottest legal issues surrounding religion 
that have confronted national and international tribunals over the past half century. How 
to protect religious minorities within a majoritarian religious culture. How to place limits 
on religious and anti-religious and cultural discrimination, or on religious and anti-
religious exercises and expressions that cause offense or harm to others. How to 
adjudicate challenges that a state's proscriptions or prescriptions run directly counter to 
a party's core claims of conscience or cardinal commandments of the faith. How to 
negotiate the complex needs and norms of religious groups without according groups 
too much sovereignty over their members or individuals too little relief from secular 
courts. How to adjudicate intra- or interreligious disputes How to determine the proper 
levels of state cooperation with and support of religious officials and institutions in the 
delivery of vital social services.  These have been the perennial issues that have long 
taxed the international human rights apparatus, as well as the courts and legislatures of 
many nation-states.   
 More recently, international attention and international law has come to focus on 
three particularly controversial issues: (1) proselytism (or evangelization in Christian 
terms), (2) conversion (especially when conceived as apostasy), and (3) blasphemy 
(recent reconceived as “defamation of religions”). Each of these three issues deserves 
further adumbration, as they are among the most hotly contested religious freedom 
 
27 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,Aug. 5, 1990, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th 
Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993) [English translation], Art. 1 
(emphasis added).  
28 Ibid., Art. 22 (emphasis added). 
29 Ibid., Art. 18 (emphasis added). 
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issues today and arise particularly when religious traditions and religious believers 
confront each other in the current global resurgence of religion. 
A. Proselytism, or Evangelization 
 Proselytism is a feature and result of the democratic revolution of the modern 
world.   New religious freedom has brought many new religious conflicts to tender new 
democracies.  In addressing instances of proselytism, states must to balance one 
community’s right to exercise and expand its faith versus another person's or 
community's right to be left alone to its own traditions.  The state must protect the 
juxtaposed rights claims of majority and minority religions, and of foreign and 
indigenous religions.  And, in the end, the state must craft a general rule to govern 
multiple theological understandings of conversion--the contemplated result of successful 
proselytism.  
 On the issue of proselytism and its regulation, the international human rights 
instruments provide some ample direction.  The ICCPR protects a person’s freedom to 
“manifest” religion or belief through “teaching,” but also prohibits outright any “coercion” 
that would impair another’s right “to have or adopt a religion or belief.” At the same time, 
it allows legal restrictions that are necessary for “respect of the rights and reputation of 
others; for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public) or of public 
health or morals” and guarantees to religious minorities “the right to enjoy their own 
culture" and "to profess and practise their own religion."30 The ICCPR thus protects the 
general right to proselytize for the sake of peaceably seeking the conversion of another.  
It provides no protection for coercive proselytism, at a minimum barring physical or 
material manipulation of the would-be convert, and in some contexts even more subtle 
forms of deception, enticement, and inducement.  It also casts serious suspicion on any 
proselytism among children or among adherents to minority religions. But, outside of 
these contexts, the religious expression inherent in proselytism is no more suspect than 
political, economic, artistic, or other forms of expression, and should have at minimum 
the same rights.   
 The problem of proselytism and retaliation has gotten worse rather than better in 
many regions in the world in the last decade.  The clashes between foreign and local 
faiths, particularly between and among Christian and Islamic groups and subgroups, 
has also spread to other regions of the world that have been newly opened to foreign 
mission by democratization, warfare, terrorism, or force majeure.  The problem of 
proselytism has taken a further ironic turn in the past decade with the establishment of 
aggressive new state policies of laicization and secularization in Europe, and the 
growing anti-sect movement in both Western Europe and the United States.  This has 
given the modern proselytism issue a strong new pluralistic dimension: how to protect 
the rights of religious minorities even while maintaining the peace, order, and integrity of 
the modern nation- state and national society.  The expulsion of Korean Christian 
missionary groups in Afghanistan in 2006 and charges by Muslims that Christians were 
dispensing religion along with humanitarian aid in tsunami-stricken Indonesia in 2005 
 
30 Art. 18, 19, and 27 are quoted in this paragraph. 
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are recent examples of the kinds of concern that proselytism and allegations of it can 
arouse in some of the most vulnerable, conflict and disaster torn areas of the world. 
 
B. Conversion and Apostasy 
 Just as one person or groups’ proselytism may interfere with another person or 
group’s liberty of conscience, one person’s freedom to convert from one faith to another 
may amount to apostasy in the eyes of the faith left behind.  Today, the issue of 
religious conversion has become more divisive than ever, in legal, theological, and 
diplomatic circles alike. Most Western Christians have easy conversion into and out of 
the faith.  Most Jews have difficult conversion into and out of the faith.  Most Muslims 
have easy conversion into the faith but allow for no conversion out of it, at least for 
prominent members.  Orthodox, Hindu, Jewish, and indigenous groups around the 
world tie religious identity not to liberty of conscience and voluntary choice, but to birth 
and caste, blood and soil, language and ethnicity. This conflation of religion with race, 
ethnicity, nationality, and other markers of identity generally taken to be given rather 
than chosen, while common to these religions and cultures, has, as we shall see, 
become problematic in recent debates over defamation of religions. 
 On the issue of religious conversion, the major international human rights 
instruments largely accept the insistence on religious voluntarism common among 
Western Christian and other proselytizing groups.  The 1948 Universal Declaration 
included an unequivocal guarantee, despite the objections of some Muslim delegations 
and organizations, that religious freedom includes a person’s right “right to change his 
religion or belief."31  Subsequent international instruments largely repeated this 
language.  But by the time of the 1981 Declaration on Religion and Belief, the dispute 
over the right to conversion had become more prominent.  The controversy over 
conversion has continued, to this day, to prompt many state delegations to dissent from 
any move toward creating a binding covenant on the topic of religious rights and 
freedoms. 
 Christians and Muslims share in common a predilection for proselytism, but differ 
profoundly on the propriety of conversion.  The question of conversion forces Christians 
to confront their own often violent histories of inquisition and heresy, in which 
banishment or execution were viewed as the only way to deal with heretics, and in 
which Jews, Muslims, and other non-Christians were at best tolerated in Christian 
society. While historically, Muslims treated Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians as fellow 
People of the Book (the dhimmi) who could enjoy a modicum of rights and autonomy, 
this tolerance has given way in some Muslim communities today to growing hostility.32  
 
31 1948 Universal Declaration, Art. 18. 
32 Donna E. Arzt, “Jihad for Hearts and Minds: Proselytizing in the Qur’an and the First Three Centuries of 
Islam” and Richard C. Martin, “Conversion to Islam by Invitation: Proselytism and the Negotiation of 
Identity in Islam,” in John Witte, Jr. and Richard C. Martin, eds. Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives 
on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism (Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2008), 89-91, 110. 
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Moreover, charges of heresy, or its stronger form, apostasy, have been increasing, in 
recent years in the Muslim world against those who seek to convert from the Muslim 
faith or resist conversion into it.   This new trend has elicited the concern and 
condemnation of many state governments and human right organizations, particularly in 
cases where the charges of heresy and apostasy are made against people who were 
born, married, or coerced into the faith and who later, upon opportunity for mature 
reflection, choose to leave.  Such charges seem to conflict directly both with human 
rights ideals of religious liberty and the Qur’anic injunction that “there can be no 
coercion in matters of faith.”33  Nevertheless, the question of conversion persists in the 
“war for souls” taking place in many regions of the world today. 
  
C. Blasphemy and “Defamation of Religions” 
 In an era in which the publication of a cartoon in Denmark depicting the prophet 
Mohammed as a terrorist can incite religious riots around the world, charges of 
blasphemy, seemingly as premodern as charges of heresy or apostasy, are making 
their way back into the headlines. Concerns about blasphemy are vividly illustrated in 
the Kambakhsh case in Afghanistan. They are also reflected in anti-blasphemy 
provisions that continue to remain on or have only recently been repealed from the 
criminal law of a number of Western European nations.34  Many Western European 
countries that outlaw denial of the Holocaust and “hate speech” also have in their midst 
thriving neo-Nazi and right-wing nationalist groups whose ideologies draw on religion, 
particularly Christianity, to entice and incited their constituencies.35 What blasphemy is--
critique of an established church, Holocaust denial, remarks that are anti-Semitic, anti-
Christian, Islamophobic, or offensive to other religious, ethnic, and cultural groups --and 
whether it should be prosecuted remain open questions in many parts of the world. 
 Over the last decade, the issue of blasphemy has surfaced at the United Nations 
and other international bodies under the rubric of “defamation of religions.”  Beginning in 
1999 when they were first proposed at the United Nations and picking up steam after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resolutions for “Combating Defamation of 
Religions,” have been generating increasing controversy.36  These resolutions have 
been proposed at both the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (renamed the 
Human Rights Council in 2006), where they have been approved each year since 
 
33 Qur’an, Surah 2:256. 
34 See Jeroen Temperman, “Blasphemy, Defamation of Religions  and Human Rights Law,” 26:4 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2008), 519-22, for a summary of blasphemy laws in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and the Scandanavian countries. 
35 Recent United States State Department International Religious Freedom reports catalogue many such 
incidents and movements in European countries under the category of “societal abuses and 
discrimination.” 
36 For a critique of these resolutions, see Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, “Combating Defamation of 
Religions.” Isssues Brief Submitted to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(Washington, DC: Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 2 June 2008)  Accessible at: 
http://www.becketfund.org/files/a9e5b.pdf, last accessed 3 May 2009. 
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1999,37 and at the larger General Assembly, where they have been approved since 
2005.38   Early drafts were controversial for their singling out of Islam and Muslims for 
particular protection.39 Subsequent versions were broadened to include respect for 
"cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity" and for "people belonging to different 
cultures, religions, and beliefs."40  Despite this more religiously plural formulation, the 
United States, several European nations, and religious freedom organizations have 
continued to object to the defamation of religions resolutions as a violation of freedoms 
of religion and speech. The resolutions, while not having the force of law, demand 
respect for Islam, but also contain language that could be used to justify persecution of 
religious minorities, particularly in Muslim countries.  Indeed, the resolutions have 
already been invoked to justify harsh blasphemy laws in Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan.  
 In recent years the defamation of religions resolutions have been drawing not 
only on international laws governing religious freedom, but also international resolutions 
against racism. The result has been a particularly provocative mixture of religion, 
ethnicity, and race that, rather than advancing growing moderation and pluralism in the 
movement against defamation of religions, has, arguably, had the effect of exacerbating 
the controversy further. These race and ethnicity arguments hearken back to the 1965 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 41 The 
convention was largely directed at discrimination based on "race, colour, descent, or 
national or ethnic origin."42  But the preamble also contemplated religious groups as 
 
37 See UN HCHR Res 1999/82, “Defamation of religions,” adopted 30 April 1999 without a vote; UN 
HCHR Res 2000/84, “Defamation of religions,” adopted 26 April 2000 adopted without a vote; UN HCHR 
Res 2001/4, “Combating defamation of religions as a means to promote human rights, social harmony 
and religious and cultural diversity,” adopted 18 April 2001 by roll-call vote, 28 to 15, with 9 abstentions; 
UN HCHR Res 2002/9, “Combating defamation of religion,” adopted 15 April 2002 by a recorded vote, 30 
to 15, with 8 abstentions; UN HCHR Res 2003/4, “Combating defamation of religions,” adopted 14 April 
2003 by a recorded vote, 32 to 14, with 7 abstentions; UN HCHR Res 2004/6, “Combating defamation of 
religions,” adopted 13 April 2004 by a recorded vote, 29 to 16, with 7abstentions; UN HCHR Res 2005/3, 
“Combating defamation of religions,” 12 April 2005, adopted by a recorded vote of 31 to 16, with 5 
abstentions; UN HCR Res 4/9, “Combating defamation of religions,” adopted 31 March 2007, adopted by 
a recorded vote of 24 to 14, with 9 abstentions, adopted by a recorded vote of 21 to 10, with 14 
abstentions; UN HCR Res 7/19, “Combating defamation of religions,” adopted 27 March 2008; UN HCR 
10/22, “Combating defamation of religions,” adopted 26 March 2009, with a recorded vote, 23-11, with 13 
abstentions. Significant here is the progression from adoption without a vote, to roll-call votes, and then 
recorded votes.  Also significant is the steadily decreasing number of votes in favor and the increasing 
number of negative votes and abstentions. 
38   UN GA 60th  Sess, Res 60/150, “Combating defamation of religions,” U.N. Doc A/Res/60/150,  
adopted 16 December 2005; UN GA 61st Sess., Res 61/164, “Combating defamation of religions,” U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/61/164, adopted 19 December 2006;  UN GA 62 Sess, Res 62/154, “Combating defamation 
of religions,’ U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/154, adopted 18 December 2007; UN GA, 63rd Sess, Res 63/171, 
“Combating defamation of religions,” adopted 18 December 2008. 
39 See UN GA 60th  Sess., Agenda Item 71(b), “Yemen Draft Resolution: Combating defamation of 
religions,” U.N. Doc. A/C.3/60/l.29, 31 October 2005 
40  UN GA Res 62/154. 
41 Specifically, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination G.A. 
res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 
entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. 
42 Ibid., Art. 1. 
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beneficiaries of its nondiscrimination provisions in affirming “human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” 
and in including "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion" in its list of fundamental 
freedoms. 43  As we have seen, the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, coming 
just before two of the bloodiest recent conflations of religion and ethnicity in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, made similar connections between religion and other markers of group identity 
and minority status.   
 The connections between religion, race, and ethnicity were made even more 
explicit in the "Durban Declaration and Programme of Action" that emerged from the 
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, held in Durban, South Africa in 2001.44  The Durban Conference adjourned 
just three days before the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001, and only after 
considerable rancor over the extent to which the Israeli-Palestine conflict dominated 
conference proceedings and news headlines. At Durban, issues of "race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin" were combined with issues of "sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, social origin, property, birth or other status" in fiery 
denunciations of "racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related tolerance."45  
The United States and Israeli delegations pulled out of the conference midway because 
of draft platform language linking Zionism to racism, and the European Union refused to 
accede to demands by Arab nations that Israeli be criticized for practices that they 
deemed racist.  The United States also boycotted the Durban Conference’s sponsoring 
organization, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as a “sham” for the 
remainder of the Bush Administration. The introduction of defamation of religions 
resolutions at the United Nations, particularly since 2001, has carried echoes of the 
Durban discord.  
 The most recent version of the defamation of religions resolutions to reach the 
U.N. General Assembly, approved in December 2008 and presumably the most 
moderate after having been the subject of criticism and modification for nearly a 
decade, began by reaffirming “universal respect for and observance of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”46  
The resolution affirmed that human rights are “universal, indivisible, interdependent, and 
interrelated.” Despite this initial appeal to universal harmony, the opening portions of the 
resolution are sprinkled with numerous references to racism, xenophobia, and the 
controversial proceedings and program of the 2001 Durban Conference. The resolution 
concluded by speculating on the “possible correlation” between defamation of religions 
and “the upsurge in incitement, intolerance and hatred in many parts of the world.”  This 
correlation, borne out empirically by such incidents as the Danish cartoon controversy, 
 
43  Ibid., Preamble and Art. 5(vii). 
44 See Durban Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, South Africa, from August 31 
through September 8, 2001. Accessible at: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/Durban.pdf,  last accessed 3 May 
2009. 
45 Ibid., Preamble. 
46 UN GA Res 63/171, “Combating defamation of religions,” approved 18 December 2008 (emphases 
added). 
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carried the ominous implication that, if the resolution were not to pass, further violence 
would ensue. 
 Just three months after the most recent approval of a “defamation of religions” 
resolution at the General Assembly, a similar resolution was approved by the Human 
Rights Council in March 2009. 47 This latest version calls for combating defamation of 
religions in much the same manner as previous iterations, but with the addition of more 
positive and pluralistic language those earlier drafts.  The resolution calls not only for 
opposition of defamation of religions, but also for “greater harmony and tolerance in all 
societies,” for “respect and understanding of religious and cultural diversity throughout 
the world,” and for recognition of the “valuable contributions of all religions to modern 
civilization and the contribution that dialogue among civilizations can make towards 
improved awareness and understanding of common values shared by all mankind.”  
Even with these pluralistic additions, the March 2009 resolution in the Human Rights 
Council resolution was the first such resolution to be adopted with more countries voting 
against or abstaining than voting in favor.48 This narrow approval has been interpreted 
by some as an indication that the movement against religious defamation has been 
largely repudiated by the international community.  It is also likely that those voting 
against or abstaining may also have been anticipating and seeking to ward off further 
controversy in April 2009 at the ten-year review of the Durban Conference against 
racism. 
 Even as the General Assembly and Human Rights Council were debating the 
most recent defamation of religions resolutions, preparations were being made for the 
Durban Review Conference (“Durban II”) scheduled to take place in Geneva in late April 
2009.  The OIC states lobbied, initially successfully, for the insertion defamation of 
religions language into the Durban II draft platform.  The United States, Israel, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and four European countries, including Germany, Italy, Poland, 
and the Netherlands, withdrew their participation in the conference when Israeli-
Palestinian issues again threatened to dominate, but the insertion of defamation of 
religions language into the draft platform became an additional reason for withdrawal. 
The defamation of religions language was withdrawn in the weeks prior to the 
conference, but it remained to be seen whether the objecting countries would 
reconsider their withdrawal.  The United States reaffirmed its non-participation, but also 
signaled a potential shift in policy with the announcement of its intent to seek a place on 
 
47 UN HRC Res 10/22 “Combating defamation of religions,” adopted 26 March 2009. 
48 The vote proceeded along the usual lines—with supporting votes coming largely from OIC members 
and opposition coming mostly from Canada and various European nations represented on the Council. 
Those voting in favor included: Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, China, 
Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa. Those voting against included: Canada, 
Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Those abstaining included: Argentina, Brazil, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Ghana, India, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Korea, 
Uruguay, and Zambia. 
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the Human Rights Council, with a view toward improving the body’s reputation through 
its participation.   
 Though Durban II began bombastically with an opening speech by Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denying the Holocaust and denouncing the state of 
Israel, it ended with an outcome document that, even while controversially affirming the 
Durban I platform, also omitted the defamation of religions language that had made it 
into earlier drafts. In its provisions addressing religion, the Durban II document officially 
deplored “global rise and number of incidents of racial or religious intolerance and 
violence, including Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and anti-Arabism” as 
well as the “derogatory stereotyping and stigmatization of persons based on their 
religion or belief.”49 It reaffirmed the prohibition of “advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”50 It 
further condemned “acts of incitement to hatred, which have targeted and severely 
affected racial and religious communities and persons belonging to racial and religious 
minorities, whether involving the use of print, audio-visual or electronic media or any 
other means” and called on the international community to “fully and effectively prohibit 
any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence.”51 Throughout the document, religion was more 
frequently analogized to more fluid and interpretive communities based on language 
and culture than to the more fixed and embodied categories of race, ethnicity, and 
nationality based on blood and land.52 Overall, the Durban II outcome document sought 
to protect persons over religions and to prohibit objectively verifiable acts of incitement 
over the subjectively felt assaults of defamation in a way that is more congruent with 
extant and emerging international norms. 
Religion, Democracy, and the Ius Gentium of Human Rights 
 The “defamation of religions” resolutions may seem to be a trend that has 
peaked or the narrow province of the OIC states.  In recent votes, support has been 
eclipsed by abstention or outright opposition.  Its removal from the Durban II 
proceedings may be taken as the international community’s acknowledgment that the 
issue serves more to divide than to unite. At the same time, “defamation of religions” 
and “hate speech” issues continue to roil certain countries and regions—most notably in 
Africa, where post-colonial, multi-ethnic states have drawn the attention of Christian and 
Muslim missionaries and have been prone to genocidal conflicts, and in Western 
Europe, where democratic, largely secular, and putatively liberal and tolerant societies 
have increasingly had to confront the status of religious minorities in their midst.  In 
those contexts, allegations of defamation of religion and incitement of hatred may be 
less a cause than a symptom of deeper conflicts and controversies at the intersection of 
 
49 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Outcome Document of the Durban 
Review Conference,” Art. 12. Accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/pdf/Durban_Review_outcome_document_En.pdf, last accessed 3 
May 2009. 
50 Ibid., Art. 13. 
51Ibid., Arts. 68, 69. 
52 Ibid., Arts. 14, 70, 82, 99, 102, 106, 109, 110, and 127. 
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religion, race, sex, ethnicity, nationality, language, culture and other markers of 
individual and group status.53   
 A truly democratic approach to religion and international human rights may 
require both normative distinctions and practical disentanglement. Rather than reducing 
religious rights to other civil and political rights, on the one hand, or analogizing religion 
to other aspects of individual and group identity, on the other, proponents of religious 
freedom may want to insist on the distinctness of religious rights as something more 
than the amalgamation of rights to speech, press, and association or just another 
identity category that can be conflated with race, ethnicity, and other criteria.  Religious 
rights have been construed largely individualistically and voluntaristically in the world’s 
secular, liberal, democracies.  A more robust notion of “religious rights” may better 
capture their communal and identity-based dimensions—often experienced as given, 
not chosen—in ways that protect the true core of religion.54 That said, the most difficult 
conflicts in years to come will be between individuals and societies for whom religion is 
a matter of choice in where one worships on the weekend and those for whom it is a 
matter of submission affecting all facets of life, both communally and comprehensively.  
 Religion may also need to be separated, as much as possible, from issues of 
race, ethnicity, and and other “givens” of individual and group identity.  These 
categories of identity may be better addressed individually than in conflation. The 
ratcheting up of religious claims through connection to more fundamental, unassailable, 
organic, blood-and-soil categories of race and ethnicity serves to insulate religion from 
valid and civil forms of external and internal critique, but at the risk of inciting even more 
virulent and violent forms of conflict. In such contexts, religion itself is diminished, 
becoming a pretext for and instrument of conflict, rather than a repository of wisdom and 
reconciliation, much less a defender of truth and justice. Again, a better understanding 
of religion, its power and its peril, might eliminate the need to “bootstrap” religion to 
greater prominence by connecting it to race, ethnicity, and other categories.  In certain 
cases and conflicts, the correlations between religion and race or ethnicity are too 
strong to be ignored.  But connecting religion to race risks ontologizing it and 
 
53 For a discussion of how recent Shari’a-based allegations of blasphemy, defamation, and apostasy by 
Muslims are “embedded within a larger discourse on identity, community, and difference, see Anver M. 
Emon, “On the Pope, Cartoons, and Apostates: Shari’a 2006,” 22 Journal of Law and Religion (2007): 
303-21. 
54 There is an ongoing discussion in legal and jurisprudential circles concerning whether religious rights 
are “special” or “distinctive.” See e.g. Steven G. Gey, "Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the 
Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 52 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 75 (1990-1991); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, "The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct," 61 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1245 (1994); Douglas Laycock, "Religious Liberty as Liberty," 7 Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues (1996); Michael W. McConnell, "The Problem of Singling Out Religion," 50 
DePaul Law Review 1 (2000-2001);  Ira C. Lupu and Robert Tuttle, "The Distinctive Place of Religious 
Entities in Our Constitutional Order," 47 Villanova Law Review 37 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, “Is It Fair 




naturalizing it in a way that eclipses or elides the nonfoundational and hermeneutical 
understandings of religion that are more conducive to the intra- and interreligious 
dialogues and discourses that are necessary to realize a common law, ius gentium 
culture of international human rights that includes religious freedom. 
 The “defamation of religions” movement, from the local level of the Kambakhsh 
case to the international wrangling at the United Nations and Durban II, may be seen as 
a particularly pointed challenge to the universality of human rights, especially those 
pertaining to religion.  It is illustrative of some important tensions that exist when law 
and religion play out in international affairs, particularly when it comes to the universality 
of human rights.  The defamation debate has served both to illustrate and to reaffirm 
some principles that do seem to be part of the ius gentium of international religious 
freedom.  First, international religious freedom provisions protect persons, and by 
extension groups of persons, not ideas, ideologies, or even religions per se.  Religious 
freedom must be realized in the open and mutually self-critical dialogue of religious 
believers and religious bodies, not caricatured in insulation from critique and encounter 
of the religious other.  Clashes of believers and bodies may be adjudicated through 
criminal laws against incitement of violence, but they should not be construed as or 
allowed to devolve into clashes of civilizations.55  Second, the justification and 
framework of international human rights has a strong bias toward the protection of 
minorities. Thus, where “defamation of religions” arguments are used to defend majority 
traditions and established religions, they are inherently suspect.  When asserted to 
protect ideas and beliefs, rather than the people and communities who hold them, and 
particularly when asserted to protect religious majorities from religious minorities without 
or from dissenters within, “defamation of religion” arguments are objectionable and anti-
democratic.56 
 The universality of human rights has held up “as long as no one asks why” in 
Maritain’s famous phrase.  The various covenants and conventions of international 
human rights law, as concerns religion, while not always unanimous in their acclamation 
or uniform in their application have generally been taken to be universal in their 
aspiration.  What happens when increased globalization, communication, and 
internationalism in the legal sphere brings to light uncomfortable differences of opinion, 
orientation, and ontology in the religious sphere?  Most religions have a stake in 
asserting the truth of their own beliefs against the apparent falsehood of the beliefs of 
others.  At the level of normative interreligious engagement, refraining from asking the 
“why” questions may be difficult if not disingenuous, if one purports to want to truly 
understand and respect religious beliefs and religious diversity.  How to have these 
conversations in a way that is both critical and constructive amid descriptive and 
doctrinal pluralism remains a crucial challenge for the international sphere. 
 
55 For a detailed critique of laws s prohibiting incitement to religious hatred in the European human rights 
system, see Susannah C. Vance, “The Permissibility of Incitement to Religious Hatred Offenses Under 
European Convention Principles,” 14 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (2004-2005): 201-
51. 
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